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THE INJURED LONGSHOREMAN vs. THE SWI1-
OWNER AFTER 1972: BUSINESS INVITEES,
LAND-BASED STANDARDS, AND
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Admiralty practitioners are quite familiar with the series of Su-
preme Court cases in the 1940's and 1950's which effectively repealed
on nonconstitutional grounds a key provision of the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHCA).1
The provision in question made liability under LHCA procedures
exclusive for employers of longshoremen (usually called stevedoring
companies or stevedores), thus protecting them from civil suits by in-
jured employees.2 This exclusive liability provision was given in ex-
change for guaranteed compensation regardless of whether the steve-
dore was negligent or had a valid defense.' Such provisions are, of
course, central to any workers' compensation system. But perhaps with
an eye on the unsatisfactory schedule of benefits under this act,4 the
Supreme Court ruled first that injured longshoremen could sue third
party vessel owners under a warranty of seaworthiness so broad that
it included conditions caused solely by the stevedore's negligence. 5 It
then held that where the unseaworthy condition which caused the in-
jury to the longshoreman arose solely because of the negligence of the
stevedore or its employees, the vessel owner who was rendered liable
to the injured longshoreman had a right to indemnification from the
stevedore." Through this triangular procedure, the stevedore was in
effect subjected to civil suit brought by its injured employees in spite
of the clear exclusive liability provision of the LHCA.
Finally, in 1972, Congress undertook to restore the immunity of
the stevedore from civil suit.7 This was done by altering the contours
of the longshoreman's third party action against vessel owners. The
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
3. 33 U.S.C. § 904(b) (1970).
4. See G. GILMORE & C. BLucK, THE LAW OF ADmIALTY 448 (2nd ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as GILMoRE & BLAcK].
5. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Petterson v. Alaska S.S.
Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), affd mem., 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
6. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co., 350 U.S. 124 (1955).
7. Act of Oct. 27, 1972 Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251, amending 33 U.S.C.
9H 901-50 (1970) (codified at 33 U.S.C. H9 901-51 (Supp. V, 1975)).
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strict liability remedy of unseaworthiness was abolished, and negligence
was made the exclusive remedy in such actions.8
The 1972 amendments, however, set no guidelines by which to
fashion a standard of care for vessel owners. But the legislative history
is full of references to "land-based standards,"9 and courts have relied
on these references to hold that vessel owners owe longshoremen the
standard of care owed to business invitees. 10 More specifically, the
courts have adopted the Restatement Second of Torts formulation of
the business invitee standard."
This note will argue that such a standard is inconsistent with many
of the policy statements in the legislative history. Congress retained
the third party action as a means of encouraging the vessel to prevent
injuries by providing a safe place for longshoremen to work. 2 The
business invitee standard, however, defines the vessel's duty in terms
of the plaintiff's perception, frequently preventing inquiry into the rea-
sonableness of the vessel's conduct. Thus, the standard not only fails
to encourage the vessel to take remedial action, but also contravenes
the comparative negligence policy' 3 of balancing the relative fault of
all the parties involved. Moreover, the business invitee standard incor-
porates the defense of assumption of risk which the legislative history
expressly abolished.' 4 The note also argues that the standard is diffi-
cult of application and therefore contrary to admiralty traditions of sim-
plicity, 5 and that the standard is a product of the common law classifi-
cation system which accorded preference to landowners.' 6 Since many
land-based jurisdictions are beginning to reconsider the classification
system, it would be unfortunate at this late date for the admiralty courts
to adopt a vestige of that system.
This note proposes an alternative standard of care17 which would
require the vessel to take reasonable remedial action with respect to
all unreasonably dangerous conditions of which it has actual or con-
structive knowledge. Analysis would focus upon the vessel's action
rather than upon the plaintiff's perceptions of the dangerous condition.
8. Id. § 18(a), 86 Stat. 1263, amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(22), 905 (codified
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(21), 905 (Supp. V, 1975)).
9. H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
COMMrrITEE REPORT].
10. See notes 99-106 & accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 107-22 & accompanying text infra.
12. COMM=rTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 6-7.
13. Although the statute is silent on the subject, the legislative history states that
Congress intended to preserve the admiralty concept of comparative negligence. COM-
MITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 8.
14. Id.
15. See notes 100-22, 150-51 & accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 123-52 & accompanying text infra.
17. See notes 153-64 & accompanying text infra.
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The vessel would be deemed to have constructive knowledge of all con-
ditions that could be discovered by a reasonable inspection, except as
to conditions arising in the area of stevedoring operations after the
stevedore commences work. With respect to such conditions, the
vessel would have a duty to take reasonable remedial action when it
has actual knowledge of their existence. The latter requirement en-
tails a rejection of the theories of relinquishment of control and "no
nondelegable duty.""'
It is recognized, however, that one of the fundamental purposes
of the 1972 amendments was to remove the flood of longshoremen's
litigation clogging the federal courts.' 9 Therefore, it is suggested that
longshoremen and stevedores should be held to a relatively strict stand-
ard of care. Such an arrangement would make it unprofitable to bring
suit in the majority of cases. Thus, the purpose of the amendments
would be fulfilled without arbitrarily cutting off the vessel's liability.
The History of Longshoremen's Third Party Actions
Traditionally, the shipowner warranted the seaworthiness of the
vessel for the benefit of cargo owners.20 In the latter part of the
19th century this warranty was expanded, 2' and by the turn of the
century the shipowner was "liable to an indemnity for injuries received
by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a fail-
ure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant
to the ship."'22 The warranty of seaworthiness was extended to seamen
because of the special hazards of their work, the rigorous discipline to
which they were subjected, and the special protection traditionally ac-
corded to them by admiralty courts.2" Since longshoremen were not
18. The Supreme Court had referred to the warranty of seaworthiness as a nondel-
egable duty. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94 n.11, 100 (1945); Petterson
v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 396 (1954). In the
Petterson case this language was used to justify inclusion within the warranty of sea-
worthiness of equipment and conditions introduced solely by the stevedore. As will be
seen, Congress was quite adamant that the warranty of seaworthiness and its "nondele-
gable duty" aspects no longer be the law in third party actions by longshoremen against
vessel owners. See notes 165-204 & accompanying text infra.
19. COMM=rErr REPORT, supra note 9, at 5; GiLMoRE & BLAcx, supra note 4, at
280, 411.
20. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 556-68 (1960) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
21. Id.
22. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). For a more detailed examination
of the late nineteenth century extension of the warranty of seaworthiness from cargo
to seamen, see Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers,
39 CORNELL L.Q. 381 (1954); Comment, Risk Distribution and Seaworthiness, 75 YALE
L.J. 1174 (1966).
23. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103 (1944).
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thought to be "seamen," they did not have the benefit of the warranty
of seaworthiness. 4 However, they could sue the shipowner for negli-
gence, a remedy that was not available to seamen.2 5 Longshoremen
also could bring negligence actions against their stevedore employers,
subject to the fellow servant rule, but, like other industrial workers, they
had no remedy for injuries from unavoidable industrial accidents.
States reacted to this situation by enacting workmen's compensa-
tion statutes, and in 1917 the Supreme Court held three such statutes
constitutional.26 Later that year, however, the Court held that state
compensation did not extend to longshoremen's shipboard injuries be-
cause of the constitutional requirement of national uniformity in the
maritime law.27 Within the next seven years Congress twice attempted
to extend state compensation benefits to longshoremen without drafting
a federal compensation scheme, but the Supreme Court struck down
both on the ground of the uniformity requirement.2 8
In the mid-1920's an injured longshoreman faced a rather grim
situation. Longshoremen did not have the seaman's remedies of un-
seaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and the Jones Act. Almost
alone among industrial workers, longshoremen were not eligible for
workmen's compensation benefits, and Congress appeared resolutely
opposed to drafting a compensation statute meeting the constitutional
requirement of uniformity. It was in this climate that the Supreme
Court decided International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,29 which ex-
tended the Jones Act remedy3" to longshoremen by holding that for
purposes of the Jones Act, longshoremen were seamen. The Court
reached this conclusion by assuming that longshoremen's work was for-
merly performed by the ship's crew.3' Within six months Congress re-
24. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 4, at 438-40.
25. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). Under The Osceola, seamen were
not only barred by the fellow servant rule but apparently had no right to sue their em-
ployers for negligence at all, unless such negligence could be characterized as unsea-
worthiness. See Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 243 F. 536 (2d Cir. 1917), af 'd,
247 U.S. 372 (1918).
26. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly,
243 U.S. 210 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
27. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917). The Court also held
that workmen's compensation benefits were not within the "saving to suitors" clause be-
cause such a compensation scheme was a remedy unknown to the common law. Id.
28. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 4, at 407-08.
29. 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
30. 48 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). The Jones Act enabled "seamen" to sue their em-
ployers for negligence. It abolished the defenses of fellow servant and assumption of
risk, and substituted comparative negligence for the harsher common law rule of con-
tributory negligence as a complete defense. The Jones Act standard of negligence is
considerably more favorable to the plaintiff than that of the general maritime law.
31. 272 U.S. at 52. In support of this proposition the Court cited Atlantic
Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914). In Imbrovek, the Court stated by way
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acted to Haverty by enacting the LHCA.32
Like most workmen's compensation statutes, the LHCA made
compensation benefits the employee's exclusive remedy against the
employer.3 Since the Jones Act only applied to suits against employ-
ers, longshoremen were effectively deprived of their newly acquired
Jones Act remedy. However, the LHCA paralleled the state statutes
in preserving the employee's right to sue third parties (almost always
the shipowner) outside the compensation system.3 4
Initially, the longshoremen's third party action was governed by
a confusing amalgam of maritime concepts of negligence85 and the land-
based concept of the duty owed to a business invitee. 6 But in 1946,
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki3 7 extended to longshoremen the seaman's
remedy for unseaworthiness. The rationale for the decision was the
questionable Haverty assumption" that unloading cargo was "per-
formed until recent times by members of the [ship's] crew,"3 9 and that
longshoremen were therefore seamen because they were "doing a sea-
man's work and incurring a seaman's hazards." 40
Subsequent cases greatly expanded the scope of the warranty of
seaworthiness. All equipment aboard the ship was warranted as sea-
worthy, including equipment owned and brought aboard by the steve-
dore solely for the purposes of unloading cargo.41 The shipowner was
liable for unseaworthy conditions arising after the stevedore assumed
complete control of the vessel,4" and for "latent" unseaworthiness
of dicta, "Formerly [loading and stowing cargo] was done by the ship's crew; but, owing
to the exigencies of increasing commerce and the demand for rapidity and special skill,
it has become a specialized service devolving upon a class 'as clearly identified with mar-
itime affairs as are the mariners."' 234 U.S. at 62.
32. Act of Mar. 4, 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-803, § 1-51, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended,
33 U.S.C. H0 901-51 (Supp. V, 1975).
33. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a)-(b) (Supp. V,
1975).
34. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975).
35. See, e.g., Anderson v. Lorentzen, 160 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1947); Grillo v. Royal
Norwegian Gov't, 139 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1943).
36. See, e.g., The Etna, 43 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
37. 328,U.S. 85 (1946).
38. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 52 (1926). See note
31 & accompanying text supra.
39. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 96 (1946).
40. Id. at 99.
41. Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd mem., 347
U.S. 396 (1954). The shipowner's liability for defective appurtenances continued even
after the equipment was removed from the ship. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Co., 373
U.S. 206 (1963); cf. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971).
42. Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), affd mem., 347
U.S. 396 (1954).
"brought into play" by the stevedore.43 Since unseaworthiness was di-
vorced from concepts of negligence, the shipowner was liable for
"transitory" conditions not in existence long enough to give constructive
notice of their presence. 44
The finishing stroke came with Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan At-
lantic Steamship Corp.45 Ryan held that a stevedore owed to a vessel
owner an implied warranty of workmanlike performance. Negli-
gence of the stevedore or its employees which caused the unseaworthi-
ness upon which a longshoreman was injured was held to be a breach
of this implied warranty46 and rendered the stevedore liable to the ves-
sel owner for indemnification of any amounts paid by the vessel owner
to the injured longshoreman. 4  This in effect deprived the stevedore
of its immunity from civil suit for damages stemming from the personal
injuries of its employees.48 Also, since few injuries were outside the
broad scope of the Sieracki doctrine of unseaworthiness, the federal
courts became flooded with longshoremen's injury actions.49
The 1972 Amendments to the LHCA
The problems engendered by the Sieracki-Ryan doctrine moti-
vated Congress to enact sweeping revisions of the LHCA. ° The 1972
amendments raised benefits from the grossly inadequate seventy dol-
lars per week maximum to a flexible figure keyed to the "national av-
erage weekly wage."'" This scheme provides compensation benefits
43. Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); McLaughlin
v. Trelleborgs Angfartygs A/B, 408 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1969).
44. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960).
45. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
46. In a later case, the Supreme Court indicated that conduct not amounting to
negligence could also constitute a breach of the warranty of workmanlike performance.
If the stevedore nonnegligently introduced defective equipment on board the vessel, and
if such equipment caused the vessel owner to be liable to an injured longshoreman, the
stevedore would be liable to the vessel owner for an indemnity under the Ryan doctrine.
Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315
(1964).
47. If the vessel owner's negligence contributed to the longshoreman's injury, there
could be no indemnity, since, during the Ryan era, the maritime law did not recognize
contribution among joint tortfeasors. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting
Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952). Recently, however, the Supreme Court has restricted the
old anti-contribution rule to LHCA cases. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc.,
417 U.S. 106 (1974).
48. See text accompanying notes 1-6 supra.
49. See COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 5; GiLMOnE & BLAcK, supra note
4, at 280, 411.
50. For a general review of the amendments see Gorman, The Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act-After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MARrTimE
L & COMM. 1 (1974).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 906(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
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usually equal to two-thirds of the average weekly wage of the injured
worker. 52  The jurisdictional limits of the LHCA were extended land-
ward to include injuries from maritime employment on an "adjoining
area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing,
or building a vessel."53  The amendments retained intact the section
making the compensation system the exclusive remedy of the employee
against the employer, and also preserved the employee's right to re-
cover against third parties. But a new provision, section 905(b), al-
tered the contours of the third party action.
The first sentence of section 905(b)5 4 permits longshoremen and
harborworkers to sue the vessel5 for negligence. The last clause of
the sentence not only abolishes the Ryan implied warranty of workman-
like performance, but also provides that an employer cannot be held
liable, "directly or indirectly," for its employees' injuries. Contractual
clauses purporting to shift this liability to the employer will be null and
void. In the second and third sentences, 56 Congress appears to have
overruled Reed v. The Yaka,57 a case which prevented the shipowner
from benefiting from the exclusive liability provision of the LHCA by
employing the longshoremen directly. 5  The fourth sentence- of sec-
tion 905(b) overrules Sieracki,59 and the last prevents the development
of a new strict liability theory by making negligence the exclusive basis
for recovery against the shipowner."
52. COMmRIrEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 2-3.
53. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
54. "In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the
negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accord-
ance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable
to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties
to the contrary shall be void." 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
55. "'The term 'vessel' means any vessel upon which or in connection with which
any person entitled to benefits under this chapter suffers injury or death arising out of
or in the course of his employment, and said vessel's owner, owner pro hac vice, agent,
operator, charter or bare boat charterer, master, officer, or crew member." 33 U.S.C.
§ 902(21) (Supp. V, 1975).
56. "If such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services,
no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons
engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If such person was employed
by the vessel to provide ship building or repair services, no such action shall be per-
mitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing ship
building or repair services to the vessel." 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
57. 373 U.S. 410, 414-15 (1963). See GILMonE & BLAcK, supra note 4, at 450.
58. See GmoRE & BLACK, supra note 4, at 444-45.
59. 'The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the
warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred." 33
U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
60. 'The remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other reme-
dies against the vessel except remedies available under this chapter." Id.
Section 905(b) merely provides the broad outlines of the third
party action, and it must be read in conjunction with the legislative his-
tory in order to discern -the congressional intent as to the applicable
standard of care. In discussing the third party action, the committee
report seeks a compromise position, rejecting both the shipping indus-
try proposal that the third party action be totally abolished and the long-
shoremen's proposal that strict liability principles be continued."' The
committee report rejects the Haverty assumption that longshoremen en-
counter seamen's hazards and therefore should have seamen's reme-
dies.62 But it states that social policies such as the protection of work-
ers' health and safety require some type of third party liability, 63 and
it concludes that fairness to all the parties involved requires that they
be placed in the same position as parties to land-based industrial acci-
dents.64 The committee report emphasizes that this position prohibits
the application of "any special maritime theory of liability or cause of
action." 65  The report specifically overrules several unseaworthi-
ness cases, but significantly it states, "[Tlhis listing of cases is not in-
tended to reflect a judgment as to whether recovery on a particular fac-
tual setting could have been predicated on the vessel's negligence."6
The report comes closest to adopting a specific standard of care with
this statement:
[T]he vessel will still be required to exercise the same care as a land-
based person in providing a safe place to work. Thus, nothing
in this bill is intended to derogate from the vessel's responsibility
to take appropriate corrective action where it knows or should have
known about a dangerous condition.67
Almost as an afterthought the report prohibits the common law de-
fenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence, and adopts
the admiralty rule of comparative negligence.68
The committee report does not seem to require the adoption of
a specific standard of care. A fair reading of the report suggests that
the repeated references to land-based principles were intended merely
to emphasize the congressional intent that no strict liability theory be
developed to take the place of unseaworthiness. 69 Except in unusual
61. COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 4-5.
62. See id. at 5-6.
63. Id. at 4, 6.
64. Id. at 6.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 80.
69. Only one court has adopted this view. In Giacona v. Capricorn Shipping Co.,
the court said: "The Committee was not so concerned with what maritime negligence
standards were at the time they were hammering out the bill as what the standards might
become .... Congress wanted to eliminate unseaworthiness for longshoremen and
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circumstances, strict liability doctrines do not apply in lawsuits involving
nonmaritime industrial injuries.70 Therefore, placing longshoremen on
an equal footing with land-based industrial workers would require that
their actions against shipowners be governed by contemporary notions
of fault. But this policy of equivalence does not appear to require
identical standards. The language of the committee report is broad
and general enough to allow courts to make the adjustments necessary
to reconcile traditional admiralty policies and the unique circumstances
of maritime industries with land-based principles.
The courts, however, have interpreted the committee report as re-
quiring absolute correspondence between the standards governing
longshoremen's third party actions and those governing lawsuits by non-
maritime industrial workers.
Application of the Business Invitee Standard
in Postamendment Cases
Admiralty courts insisting that land-based and shipboard standards
of care be identical have turned to the Restatement Second of Torts
for guidance. Section 343 of the Restatement holds a possessor of land
liable to business invitees if he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover
the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable
risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger,
or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the
danger.
Subsection (b) above is intended to be read in conjunction with section
343A(l) of the Restatement:
A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm
caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose
danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should
anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.
These sections impose a duty of reasonable care on a possessor of land
if he has or should have knowledge of the danger. But the duty of
care is removed if the land possessor can expect that his invitees will
notice the danger.
Thus, under these sections, a vessel owner's duty of care is partly
defined by the injured longshoreman's perceptions of the danger.
wanted to prevent the same benefits of unseaworthiness from accruing to the longshore-
men under a different name, that of 'negligence.' The language defendant uses to sup-
port its argument is more precisely seen as part of the effort to do away with unsea-
worthiness than the effort to create a new heretofore unknown remedy." Giacona v.
Capricorn Shipping Co., 394 F. Supp. 1189, 1193-94 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
70. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 409-29 (1965).
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Whether such a standard reintroduces into admiralty the defense of as-
sumption of risk in the form of a limitation on the defendant's duty of
care is the question next considered.
Assumption of Risk
The committee report makes clear the congressional intent that
the admiralty rules favoring comparative negligence and precluding the
defense of assumption of risk be preserved under the 1972 amend-
ments.71 The admiralty has a strong policy favoring these longstanding
rules. The rule precluding the defense of assumption of risk originated
in 1936 with two Jones Act cases, The Arizona v. Anelich71 and Beadle
v. Spencer.73  Since the Jones Act 74 incorporated the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act,75 these two cases presented the issue of whether the
FELA's circumscribed version of assumption of risk76 was to be im-
ported into maritime law through the Jones Act.77 The Supreme Court
avoided this problem by finding that the defense of assumption of risk
had never been available in the maritime law.7 6 Two years later the
Court confirmed this position in Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 79
stating that the traditional maritime policy of protecting seamen "will
be best served by applying the rule of comparative negligence, rather
than that of assumption of risk, to the seaman who makes use of a de-
fective appliance knowing that a safe one is available."'80 This rule ap-
plies not only to the Jones Act, but to all such maritime claims,8' includ-
ing longshoremen's actions.
After Socony, the unavailability of assumption of risk encouraged
defendants to attempt to disguise assumption of risk as contributory
negligence in order to salvage a reduction of damages.8 2 Courts ada-
mantly refused to "allow assumption of risk to masquerade as contribu-
tory negligence, '8 but this position required drawing a precise bound-
ary between the two defenses. It was obvious that the line had to be
71. COMMIrEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 8.
72. 298 U.S. 110 (1936).
73. 298 U.S. 124 (1936).
74. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
75. 45 U.S.C. H9 51-60 (1970).
76. Assumption of risk was abolished as a defense to an action under the FELA
in 1939. Act of Aug. 11, 1939, ch. 685, §§ 1, 4, 53 Stat. 1404 (codified at 45 U.S.C.
H§ 51, 54 (1970)).
77. GiMoRE & BLAcK, supra note 4, §§ 6-27, at 353-54.
78. Id.
79. 305 U.S. 424 (1939).
80. Id. at 432.
81. Rivera v. Rederi A/B Nordstjernan, 456 F.2d 970, 973 (1st Cir. 1972).
82. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 4, §§ 6-27, at 353-54.
83. Rivera v. Rederi A/B Nordstjernan, 456 F.2d 970, 974 (1st Cir. 1972).
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drawn at the point at which the plaintiff's decision to proceed in the
face of a known risk became unreasonable. In employment situations,
admiralty courts have found that in the face of a known risk, the duty
to exercise reasonable care for his own safety requires the employee
to complain about the danger."4 If the employee complains of the dan-
ger and his superior promises to repair it or orders him to continue
working, neither assumption of risk nor contributory negligence may
be asserted against the employee."5 However, a failure to complain,
if it is unreasonable, may result in a reduction of damages.8 8
The Restatement Second of Torts' section 343-343A standard of
care is fundamentally inconsistent with these admiralty notions of as-
sumption of risk and contributory negligence. It is generally conceded
that the land-based concept of assumption of risk as a bar to the plain-
tiff's recovery is written into the section 343-343A standard.8 7  Many
courts have held that an instruction on the standard of care owed to
business invitees serves the same purpose as an instruction on assump-
tion of risk, and in cases where both are in issue the latter instruction
need not be given.88  Where invitees voluntarily encounter a known
dangerous condition, courts have provided different rationales for the
denial of recovery. Some courts have stated that the defendant owes
no duty, while others have found that the defendant breached his duty
but that the plaintiff assumed the risk. 9 It may be argued that under
the "no duty" view, the section 343-343A standard is not inconsistent
with an abolition of assumption of risk because the denial of liability
does not rest on the affirmative defense. According to this view as-
sumption of risk would not have to be pleaded ° and the jury would
84. Compare Rivera v. Farrell Lines, 474 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1973), and Rivera
v. Rederi A/B Nordstjernan, 456 F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1972) (complaint by plaintiffs fel-
low employee held sufficient), with Mroz v. Dravo Corp., 429 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir.
1970), and DuBose v. Matson Navigation Co., 403 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1968); cf. Gm.-
MORE & BLACK, supra note 4, §§ 6-27a, at 357, n.165m.
85. A longshoreman does not assume the risk of obeying the orders of his supe-
rior, but "[Ujnwarranted obedience to an obviously dangerous order would be negli-
gence which would mitigate damages." Klimaszewski v. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co., 246
F.2d 875, 877 (3d Cir. 1957).
86. Id.
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECo ND) OF TORTS § 496C, comment d (1965); RESTATE-
MENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 521, comment a (1957).
88. See, e.g., Johanson v. Nash Finch Co., 216 N.W.2d 271, 276 (N.D. 1974).
89. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 496C, comment d (1965).
90. This view gives the plaintiff the burden of proving either that he didn't appre-
ciate the danger or that he didn't encounter it voluntarily. See Popejoy v. Hannon, 37
Cal. 2d 159, 170, 231 P.2d 484, 491 (1951); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
521, comment d (1957); RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C, comment d (1965).
This not only forces the plaintiff to prove a negative, but also has the effect of forcing
plaintiff to rebut a prima facie showing that he assumed the risk, when in fact the de-
fendant has made no showing at all.
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not be instructed on it. But this argument exalts form over substance,
because "the effect of either ground of decision is the same."'"
Like the admiralty courts, land-based courts have had occasion to
examine the gray area in which assumption of risk overlaps contributory
negligence. The Restatement Second of Torts lists four different spe-
cies of assumption of risk. 92 The third category includes cases in which
a plaintiff proceeds voluntarily and with reasonable care in the face of
a known risk; the fourth category includes cases in which a plaintiff
proceeds voluntarily but carelessly in the face of a known risk. The
Restatement notes that the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct is
determined by weighing the utility of the conduct against the magni-
tude of the risk. 93  However, many states have adopted the admiralty
rule of comparative negligence while maintaining the defense of as-
sumption of risk.9 4 With respect to such jurisdictions, the Restatement
suggests that in situations where assumption of risk overlaps contribu-
tory negligence, assumption of risk should not be allowed to bar the
plaintiffs recovery because it would defeat the policy of "reduc[ing]
the damages in the case of all such negligent conduct, whatever the
defense may be called."95  Thus, even if the 1972 amendments to the
LHCA had not expressly proscribed the defense of assumption of risk,
the 343-343A standard, with its incorporated notions of assumption of
risk, would be unacceptable because it is inconsistent with the policy
of comparative negligence. Since assumption of risk has been ex-
pressly disallowed, this conclusion is even stronger.9 6
The Postamendment Cases
As has been suggested, the application of the Restatement's for-
mulation of the business invitee standard is fraught with theoretical
91. "The proper ground, however, would appear to be assumption of risk in any
case where there is a duty in the first instance. The distinction may, however, become
important as to the burden of proof, or where statutes have abrogated the defense of
assumption of risk." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C, comment d (1965)
(citations omitted).
92. Id. § 496A, comment c. The first category includes cases where the plaintiff
expressly consents to relieve the defendant of the duty of exercising reasonable care.
The second category includes cases where such consent is implied from the nature of
the plaintiff's relationship with the defendant.
93. Id. § 496E, comment d.
94. See, e.g., Hass v. Kessell, 245 Ark. 361, 432 S.W.2d 842 (1968); Dorta v.
Blackburn, 302 So. 2d 450 (Fla. App. 1974); Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d
646 (1947).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A, comment d (1965).
96. Under statutes abrogating the defense of assumption of risk, "the plaintiff is
protected if he acts with reasonable care in view of the danger which he encounters,
even though he knows of the danger and proceeds in the face of it." Id., comment e.
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problems. Nevertheless, the weight of the authority seems to be in
favor of its application to longshoremen's third party actions.97
The leading case adopting the section 343-343A standard is Ram-
irez v. Toko Kaiun.98  The plaintiff in Ramirez was a longshoreman
who was injured while unloading a cargo of pipe. The pipe had been
stowed by the "solid block stow" method, meaning that it was not bun-
dled or separated by dunnage. The unloading method required slip-
ping a wire through one end of a stack of pipe, raising that end, and
then slipping an unloading harness underneath the center of the bun-
die. The plaintiff's team complained about the danger of this method
and requested "on-the-spot dunnage," but they were told to keep work-
ing. The plaintiff's injury occurred when the wire slipped loose and
a partially raised bundle of pipe fell on his foot.
Applying the section 343 standard, the first question the court
faced was whether the condition of the cargo posed an unreasonable
risk of harm to longshoremen attempting to unload it.99 The court
found that "solid block stow" was a common method of stowing cargo
and that it was commonly unloaded with reasonable safety. 10 Since
the condition was not unreasonably dangerous the vessel had no duty
in the first instance to repair it or warn of its existence, and judgment
was entered for the defendant.
Ramirez does not deal exclusively with the plaintiff's perceptions.
But this analysis is not a result of the court's application of the section
343 standard; rather it resulted from the stage of the section 343 stand-
ard that was in issue. If the condition had been unreasonably danger-
ous, then the court would have applied the next stage of the standard,
dealing with the plaintiffs conduct in the face of the danger. 10 '
Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp' is an early case involving an
obvious danger, and the facts of the case more aptly demonstrate the
potential injustice in the application of the business invitee standard to
longshoremen. In Hite, the plaintiff was employed by an independent
ship cleaning contractor. While working at the top of a petroleum
tank, he brushed against a frayed drop wire hanging nearby. The elec-
tric shock knocked him off the scaffold, and he fell thirty feet to the
bottom of the tank. The court held that the vessel had no duty to re-
97. See, e.g., Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md.
1975); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Md. 1975);
Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun, 385 F. Supp. 644, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1975). To date, the only
case which has rejected this standard is Marant v. Farrell Lines, nc., 1976 A.M.C. 504,
506-08 (E.D. Pa.).
98. 385 F. Supp. 644, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
99. Id.; see RESTATEM ENT (SEcoND) 6F TORTS-§ 343(i) (1965).
100. 385 F. Supp. at 653.
101. See note 103 infra.
102. 380 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
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pair or warn about the condition because it was open and obvious.1 03
Here, the analysis focused upon what the plaintiff could reasonably
have been expected to perceive and not upon what the vessel should
or should not have done about the condition.104
In Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera,.0 5 the death of
plaintiffs decedent resulted from breathing poisonous gases while in-
specting a recently fumigated cargo of grain. A temporary bulkhead
blocked the ship's ventilation system and caused the gases to linger in
the hold. The court granted a summary judgment for the defendant
because the plaintiff made no showing that the vessel knew or should
have known that the cargo would be fumigated. 0 6 However, in a dic-
tum application of the section 343 standard, the court stated the de-
fendant's duty in terms of the plaintiff's perceptions; the defendant
would have had no duty to warn because "the defect in the ventilation
of the hold, the existence of a barrier to the movement of air, was read-
ily visible to anyone entering the hold."'1 7
In both Anuszewski v. Dynamic Marines Corp.05 and Crowshaw
v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Riswik, 0 9 the vessels and the plaintiffs
had actual knowledge of the dangerous conditions, but the courts
reached different results. In Anuszewski, a loading crane dislodged
a hatch cover beam which the stevedore had negligently allowed to re-
main in place after the hatch cover had been removed. The beam fell
into the hold and struck the plaintiff. Safety regulations required such
beams to be fastened by pins," 0 but the beams had been left unfas-
tened in a previous port. The plaintiff's crew complained about the
condition, but their foreman promised it would be corrected and or-
dered them to continue working."' Applying the accepted standard,
the court held that the vessel knew that the condition posed an unrea-
sonable risk of harm, but that its liability was cut off because it could
have expected the plaintiffs to protect themselves against it. 1 2
103. Id. at 227.
104. The court also said, "There were no facts presented by the plaintiff that would
support a jury finding that the officers or crew of the [ship] maintained any degree of
control or supervision of the work being performed by the plaintiff during the course
of the cleanup operation." Id. at 224. It is difficult to see how the vessel's control
could have changed the result. Since the court held that the vessel had no duty because
the condition was obvious, the vessel's control or lack of control was irrelevant to the
existence of a duty.
105. 394 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. La. 1975).
106. Fumigation occurred after the stevedore commenced operations, and no crew
member remained aboard who might have known of the condition. Id. at 415-16.
107. Id. at 415.
108. 391 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Md. 1975).
109. 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Ore. 1975).
110. 391 F. Supp. at 1145; cf. 39 C.F.R. § 1918.43(e).
111. 391 F. Supp. at 1144.
112. Id. at 1148.
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In Crowshaw, the dangerous condition was a swinging deck block
which was part of the hatch opening mechanism. Some time after the
stevedore commenced operations, the block was left in a precarious
erect position. The plaintiff brushed against it, and it swung down and
crushed his foot. After stating that the vessel could not be liable for
dangerous conditions in an area over which the stevedore had exclusive
control, the court found that control over the block was shared.113 The
court held that both the stevedore and the vessel negligently failed to
discover the condition and warn the longshoremen about it.1 4 Al-
though the court did not specifically mention it, this holding requires
findings that the condition was unreasonably dangerous"i 5 and that the
vessel should have expected that the plaintiff "[would] not discover
or realize the danger, or [would] fail to protect [himself] against it."" 6
The Court, however, went on to find that the plaintiff had not exercised
reasonable care in inspecting and working around the block,1" 7 and his
recovery was reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence.
In Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc.,"' the plaintiff was in-
jured when he slipped off a ladder and fell into the hold. The plain-
tiffs longshoring crew had returned on the second day of work to find
the hold, ladders, and decks covered with a thin film of grease. The
source of the grease was never determined. The danger was aggra-
vated by the fact that the edge of the hatch hung over the top rung
of the access ladder, requiring the longshoremen to maintain a precari-
ous position while reaching for the first step. A cleaning agent was
used on the decks, but it could not be used on the ladder. The plain-
tiff was injured when he slipped off the first step while descending the
ladder late in the day, after much grease had been tracked up and
down. Since the condition was both unreasonably dangerous and obvi-
ous, the sole issue, under 343A, was
whether a reasonable jury could find that the owner should have
expected that the stevedore would not correct and the longshoremen
would not protect themselves against the known danger or that
the owner should have otherwise anticipated the harm despite such
knowledge. 119
113. 398 F. Supp. at 1231.
114. Id.
115. See RESTATEmmNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 343(a) (1965).
116. Id. § 343(b).
117. "Mhe precarious elevation of the block which caused Croshaw's [sic] injury
would have been obvious to the naked eye. Crowshaw's lack of familiarity with the
block did not excuse him from a duty of inspection. His failure to make a reasonable
inspection and the manner in which he worked near the block constituted contributory
negligence." 398 F. Supp. at 1231 (emphasis added).
118. 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975).
119. Id. at 1101.
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The court said that the shipowner would have been liable if the acci-
dent had occurred in the morning, because it was foreseeable that the
stevedore would not have had time to perform its duty of cleaning up
and making the work area safe.12 However, the court held that the
shipowner escaped liability because it could not have foreseen that the
stevedore would fail to perform its duty throughout the day, and that
if any negligence was the cause of the plaintiff's injury, it was solely
that of the stevedoring company and the plaintiff himself. 2 '
Although the stevedore was not a party to the action in Frasca,
its negligence appears to have barred the plaintiff's recovery. More-
over, the court's preoccupation with the nonfeasance of the stevedore
distracted its attention from the universally accepted principle that "the
failure of a third person to act to prevent harm to another threatened
by the actor's negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of such
harm.' 1 22  The statement that the shipowner would have been liable
if the accident had occurred in the morning suggests that it was negli-
gent in some degree. Rather than examining the conduct of third par-
ties in a search for a superseding cause, the court should have measured
the relative negligence of the parties to the action.
The Future of 343-343A in Land-Based Jurisdictions
One of the ironies involved in the adoption of land-based stand-
ards by admiralty courts is that land-based courts are beginning to crit-
icize the traditional common law rules according -the interests of prop-
erty owners preference over the interests of persons injured on their
land. In Rowland v. Christian,'2' the California Supreme Court abol-
ished the rigid categories which classified plaintiffs according to their
purpose in entering the land. Many other jurisdictions have followed
this lead.'24 The courts give three reasons for the change in attitude.
First the classification system had evolved into a highly technical state,
with fine distinctions and exceptions within exceptions, and the sheer
complexity made the system too ponderous to function as an efficient
judicial tool.125  Second, because of the great increase in population,
120. Id. at 1101-02.
121. Id. at 1102.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 452(1) (1965). Although the rule
speaks of an actor's "conduct," illustrations five, six, and seven show that it extends to
dangerous conditions.
123. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
124. See, e.g., Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 28 Colo. App. 400, 474 P.2d 796
(1970); Mounsey v. Elard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Peterson v. Balach,
294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972).
125. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 116, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70
Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1968); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 28 Colo. App. 400, 404,
474 P,2d 796, 798-99 (1970).
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the flow of large numbers of people into urban areas, and the modem
practice of living in close proximity, more individuals are exposed to
the dangers of any given piece of property. 126  This greater exposure
justifies the imposition of a higher standard of care upon property own-
ers. Third, the classification system arose in a feudal society which
revered the ownership of property and viewed the landowner as "a sov-
ereign within his own boundaries.' 27  Since landowners no longer
dominate the social hierarchy, they should be held to the same standard
of care as the rest of the population. Courts view it as anomalous that
"[w]hile negligence has emerged as the main basis of liability -for unin-
tended torts, real property law and theory still dominate recovery for
injuries occurring on private property.'1 28  In jurisdictions which have
abolished the common law categories, the landowner's duty of reason-
able care, formerly owed only to business invitees, has been extended
to all persons lawfully on the property. 2 9
This criticism has been directed toward -the system of pigeonhol-
ing and not at the nature and scope of the business invitee duty. How-
ever, it may be argued that the business invitee standard of care is
tainted by the same infirmities that resulted in the downfall of the clas-
sification system.13 0  The standard is difficult of application, 3 ' and its
technical niceties often exonerate a landowner even when he has failed
to exercise reasonable care. 132  Because landowners traditionally were
allowed to act freely within the boundaries of their property, the land-
owner's duty to entrants was not thought to arise from his maintaining
a dangerous condition, but from his superior knowledge of its exist-
ence. 133  Thus, entrants were not actually entitled to reasonably safe
126. See, e.g., Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 696 (Fla. 1973) (disapproving the
classification system but not rejecting it).
127. Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 695, 297 N.E.2d 43, 45 (1973); accord,
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1958); W.
PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 357 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
128. Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 167, 199 N.W.2d 639, 643 (1972).
129. See, e.g., Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Powers
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1973).
130. See Basso v. Miller, 45 U.S.L.W. 2006 (N.Y. Ct. App. June 17, 1976). There,
the New York court abolished the classification system but expressly incorporated one
of its elements, the likelihood of the plaintiff's presence on the land, into the new stand-
ard of care owed by landowners to all entrants.
131. See notes 97-122 & accompanying text supra.
132. Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Md. 1975),
is the best example of this point. The court concluded that "[tuhe failure of the vessel
to lock or fasten the beams constituted negligence on the part of the shipowner....
[But] negligence on the part of the ship is not actionable negligence . . . ." Id. at
1145. The reason the business invitee standard exonerates negligent defendants is that
it incorporates the defense of assumption of risk. See notes 71-96 & accompanying text
supra. Moreover, it shifts to the plaintiff the burden of proving that he did not assume
the risk. See RESTATEm:ENT (SECoND) OF AGENCy § 521, comments a, d (1957).
133. See, e.g. Hokanson v. Joplin Rendering Co., 509 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1974).
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premises, but merely to equal knowledge of the dangers. 84 In our
crowded modem society where people live shoulder-to-shoulder, a dan-
gerous condition will inevitably result in a number of injuries, regard-
less of whether the condition is known or obvious.' 1 Courts are finally
accepting this fact; language in recent opinions suggests that no longer
will a mere warning automatically discharge a landowner's duty.1 6 In
the future, the burden of remedial action will be weighed against the
seriousness and likelihood of injury to determine what protective ac-
tion will be required of a landowner. 137  Such a balancing process is
consistent with the manner in which courts determine the rights and
duties of parties to tort actions in which property ownership is not a
factor. 138
The Demise of Control
An analogous development has been taking place with respect to
the landowner's responsibilities to the employees of an independent
contractor. When an independent contractor is involved inquiry into
the landowner's duty usually focuses on the question of control. Tradi-
tionally, when a landowner relinquished control of the premises, 89 he
had no responsibility for dangerous conditions arising thereafter. When
he maintained control of the premises, he had a continuing duty to the
employees of the independent contractor, as well as to all other busi-
ness invitees. 40  The general rule of nonliability after relinquishment
of control has been riddled with exceptions. 4' It is generally accepted
that the presence of an independent contractor will not shield the land-
134. Id. See also PROSSER, supra note 127, at 394.
135. See Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 696 (Fla. 1973).
136. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
suggested that a landowner's duty with respect to a dangerous condition should be deter-
mined by the flexible balancing test used in other areas of tort law. Smith v. Arbaugh's
Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972). "A landowner must act as a reasonable
man in maintaining his premises in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circum-
stances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury and
the burden of avoiding the risk." Id. at 100.
137. Id.
138. See Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 28 Colo. App. 400, 404-05, 474 P.2d
796, 798-99 (1970).
139. Control over the premises should be distinguished from control over the con-
tractor's conduct and methods of operation. If the landowner maintains control over
the contractor's methods, then the contractor is not "independent" and the landowner
may be liable on a theory of respondeat superior. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §§ 2,220 (1957).
140. PROSSER, supra note 127, at 386.
141. "Indeed it would be proper to say that the rule is now primarily important
as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions." Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler
& Mfg. Co., 201 Minn. 500, 503, 277 N.W. 226, 228 (1937). See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 409-29 (1965).
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owner from liability if he was negligent in selecting'4 or instructing'"
the contractor if the work relates to a special class of persons such as
the general public 44 or the employer's tenants, 14 or if the work is ab-
normally or inherently dangerous. 146  These exceptions are milestones
in a trend toward disregarding a landowners relinquishment of control
as conclusively establishing his lack of liability. On the frontier of this
trend is a movement to impose a duty on the landowner to protect em-
ployees of independent contractors against all conditions of which he
has actual knowledge. 47  This duty exists even when the dangerous
condition arises after the landowner has relinquished control of the
premises.
48
Like the business invitee standard of care, the rule that a land-
owner has no duty with respect to conditions arising after he has relin-
quished control of the premises is rooted in real property law. The
rule does not focus on the exercise of reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances but rather upon possession and control of property. Be-
cause the original reasons for their existence have long since disap-
peared, the concepts have an uncertain future in land-based tort law.
In their waning years, they certainly should not be imported into the
maritime law.149  The 905(b) standard should comport with the ad-
miralty's "traditions of simplicity and practicality"' 05 and should be
"free from inappropriate common-law concepts."'' It should be flex-
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF ToRs § 411 (1965).
143. Id. §§ 410, 413.
144. Id. §§ 415, 417-18, 425.
145. Id. §§ 419-21.
146. Id. §§ 413, 416, 423, 427-27A.
147. In Warren v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp., 477 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1973), the
landowner had a representative on the construction site who had actual knowledge of
the danger but exercised no control over the premises or the contractor's methods of op-
eration. The court affirmed a judgment in favor of the contractor's employee against
the landowner, stating: "In the presence of a known danger, the fact that the dangerous
condition was created or partially caused by an independent contractor will not shield
the landowner from legal liability." Id. at 234. According to the Fifth Circuit court
of appeals, "Florida follows the rule that where an employer gains knowledge of a dan-
gerous situation created by an independent contractor it may incur liability through its
failure to halt the operation or otherwise remove the danger." Emelwon, Inc. v. United
States, 391 F.2d 9, 11 (5th Cir. 1968). Sposito v. Zeitz, 23 Wis. 2d 159, 127 N.W.2d
43 (1964), arose under the Wisconsin safe place statute, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.11
(1973). The landowner had no control over the construction site, but the court said
by way .of dicta: "Where such dangers arose, however, out of acts of the contractors
or resulted from their failure properly to maintain equipment, we think the owner has
not violated the safe place statute until he has had actual or constructive notice of the
defect." 23 Wis. 2d at 162, 127 N.W.2d at 45.
148. See cases cited in note 147 supra.
149. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31
(1958).
150. Id. at 631.
151. Id. at 630.
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ible and adaptable enough to reflect future developments in land-based
torts concepts.' 52 Anachronisms and rigidity are built into the business
invitee standard and the relinquishment of control rule.
A Proposed Standard of Care
Injuries of longshoremen can be divided into three broad cate-
gories. The first category includes injuries caused by conditions in ex-
istence when the stevedore first boards the ship; the second, injuries
from conditions arising after the stevedore commences operations; and
the third, injuries caused by the operating negligence of the longshore-
man's co-workers. The third category poses no possibility of vessel lia-
bility under the 1972 amendments and will not be discussed here.' 53
Conditions within the first category include holes in cargo loaded
in a previous port, 54 cargo from a previous port stowed in such a man-
ner that it cannot be unloaded with reasonable safety, 155 temporary de-
fects in the ship's appliances in existence when the stevedore com-
mences operations, 156 and permanent defects in the ship's appliances
or design.' 5 7  The first step in analyzing the vessel's duty with respect
to such conditions should be to determine whether the vessel had actual
knowledge of the condition or would have discovered it through a rea-
152. Another recent trend in land-based jurisdictions has been the abolition of as-
sumption of risk and the adoption of comparative negligence as a substitute for contribu-
tory negligence. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (Supp. 1976-77); ORE.
REv. STAT. § 18.470 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (Supp. 1976); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.045 (1966 & Supp. 1975-76). The business invitee standard incorporates the old
common law version of these defenses as complete bars to the plaintiff's recovery. See
notes 71-96 & accompanying text supra. Thus the standard not only contravenes the
express directive of the committee report, but also is inconsistent with future develop-
ments in land-based law.
153. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971), distinguishes dan-
gerous conditions and operating negligence. A longshoreman injured by the conduct of
his co-workers clearly is barred from suing the stevedore by the exclusive liability provi-
sion of the LHCA, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (Supp. V, 1975). He cannot recover from the
vessel because the operating negligence of the employees of an independent contractor
will not be imputed to the employer of the contractor. The vessel is liable for the oper-
ating negligence of a crew member under the doctrine of respondeat superior. There
are numerous cases involving the stevedore's operating negligence. See, e.g., Slaughter
v. S.S. Ronde, 390 F. Supp. 637 (S.D. Ga. 1974); Knox v. United States Lines, 186 F.
Supp. 668 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
154. See, e.g., Citizen v. M/V Triton, 384 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Fedison
v. Vessel Wislica, 382 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. La. 1974).
155. See, e.g., Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124
(1956); Anderson v. Lorentzen, 160 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1947); The Etna, 43 F. Supp.
303 (E.D. Pa. 1942); cf. Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun, 385 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
156. See, e.g., Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); An-
uszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Md. 1975); Hite v. Mari-
time Overseas Corp., 380 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
157. See, e.g., Pioneer S.S. Co. v. McCann, 170 F. 873 (6th Cir. 1909).
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sonably diligent investigation. In contrast to the unseaworthiness doc-
trine, the vessel would not be liable for unknown or undiscoverable
conditions.Y58
The next question is whether the condition involves an unreason-
able risk of harm. The policy of encouraging vessels to eliminate dan-
gerous conditions demands that this be the central question in deter-
mining whether a vessel owner has breached a duty to the injured long-
shoreman. The obviousness of a condition should not be a controlling
factor in weighing -the dangers. This would insert notions of assump-
tion of risk and is better left to comparative negligence analysis.
If a condition is determined to be unreasonably dangerous, then
the last question is what remedial action is required to discharge the
duty of reasonable care. The answer should be obtained by weighing
the burden of remedial action against the likelihood of injury. For ex-
ample, the likelihood of injury from a hole in the cargo may be rela-
tively slight, but -the risk would appear to outweigh the burden of re-
pairing the condition by spreading dunnage over it. On the other hand,
there are some conditions which cannot be repaired. In the case of
a structural defect in the ship, for example, the shipowner cannot be
expected to rebuild the whole ship for the benefit of longshoremen,
nor can he be expected to unload the cargo himself. The shipowner
depends on the stevedore to unload cargo, and longshoremen are paid
for their skill in handling dangerous cargo. Where remedial action is
impossible, or the attendant burden outweighs the risk of harm, a warn-
ing is all that may reasonably be expected of the vessel. A single
verbal warning may be inadequate where the longshoremen are likely
to forget about the danger or become preoccupied with their work.6 9
In such cases a written warning should be posted or continual verbal
reminders should be given.
Conditions within the second category arise on portions of the ship
affected by stevedoring operations after the stevedore commences
work. Category two conditions include defective equipment brought
aboard by the stevedore,1 60 holes or other conditions that develop in
the cargo as it is being loaded,"' slippery substances spilled during
stevedoring operations,' 6 and appliances of the ship which are nor-
mally safe but become dangerous after the stevedore has commenced
158. See COMMITTE REPoRT, supra note 9, at 6-7 (example suggesting no liability
without actual or constructive notice).
159. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 343A (1965).
160. See, e.g., Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), af'd,
347 U.S. 396 (1954).
161. See, e.g., Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1975).
162. See, e.g., Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md.
1975).
operations.163 It is proposed that the vessel's liability for category two
conditions should be substantially similar to its liability for conditions
within category one. The only difference should be that with respect
to category two conditions, the vessel should have no duty to inspect
and therefore should be liable only where it has actual knowledge of
the condition.16 4
Relinquishment of Control and Nondelegable Duty
Two lines of criticism will be directed at this proposal. First, it
will be said that the vessel cannot be liable for conditions arising in
a part of the ship after control over that area has been relinquished
to the stevedore. 65 Second, it will be said that this imposes a nondel-
egable duty on the vessel, and that the committee report expressly pre-
cludes "nondelegable duty" as a theory of recovery.'66 This proposal
rejects the doctrines of relinquishment of control and delegabiity of
duty because they are confusing and metaphysical, and because they
163. See, e.g., Nuzzo v. Rederi, 304 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1962); Grays Harbor Steve-
dore Co. v. Fountain, 5 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1925); Crowshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd,
B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Ore. 1975).
164. Imposing a duty to conduct reasonable inspections might force the vessel to
interfere with stevedoring operations. This proposal allows the vessel to rely upon the
stevedore's expertise until the vessel acquires knowledge of a danger. See Frasca v. Pru-
dential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975).
165. One pre-Sieracki case, applying negligence principles, held that a shipowner
could not be liable for a dangerous condition arising after control had been relinquished
to the stevedore. Grasso v. Lorentzen, 149 F.2d 127, 129 (2d Cir. 1945). A similar
result was reached under the Sieracki doctrine when the Third Circuit held that the duty
to provide a seaworthy ship ended when the shipowner relinquished control to the steve-
dore. Lopez v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 201 F.2d 418, 420 (3d Cir. 1953). The
Supreme Court, summarily affirming a Ninth Circuit opinion, in effect overruled both
Grasso and Lopez, holding that the shipowner's control was only relevant to negligence,
and since unseaworthiness was a strict liability remedy the shipowner was liable despite
relinquishing control. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), aff'g 205 F.2d
478 (9th Cir. 1953). Because it had been withdrawn from navigation, no warranty of
seaworthiness covered the ship in West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959). The
Court held that the shipowner could not be guilty of negligence because he had no con-
trol over the ship or the repair operations. Id. at 123. These cases will be asserted
to support the argument that the relinquishment of control doctrine applies to 905(b)
negligence actions. This argument may be rebutted on the following grounds. First,
the 1972 amendments did not reinstate pre-Sieracki maritime negligence law; the com-
mittee report expressly disapproved maritime negligence theories. Admittedly, the com-
mittee report can be interpreted as referring only to maritime theories favorable to plain-
tiffs, and because relinquishment of control is a defendant's doctrine it may not be af-
fected by the reference to maritime theories. But such an interpretation would not re-
quire relinquishment of control to be incorporated into the 905(b) standard; it would
merely allow courts to adopt the doctrine if they deemed it advisable. For reasons de-
veloped in the text, such an adoption would not be advisable. See text accompanying
notes 182-85 infra.
166. See CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
January 19771 THE INJURED LONGSHOREMAN vs. THE SHIPOWNER 793
yield results that do not reflect the proportional fault of each of the
parties involved.
The doctrines of relinquishment of control and nondelegable duty
overlap and interrelate,'16 7 but for purposes of clarity they will be ex-
amined separately. Possession and control of premises, as opposed to
actual ownership, is the basis of liability for dangerous conditions
thereon. 1 8 The concept of control also determines whether an agent
is a servant or an independent contractor.169 Thus, an owner or a prin-
cipal is not liable for dangerous conditions if he has relinquished control
of the premises, and he is not liable for the acts of an independent con-
tractor because he has no control over the methods of the independent
contractor. If he relinquishes control of property to an independent
contractor, ordinarily he is liable for neither the dangerous condition
of the property nor the negligent conduct of the contractor.1 7
Much confusion, however, has surrounded the doctrine of control
because of the failure to distinguish between conduct and conditions. 71
Where employees of independent contractors have been injured by
conditions on the premises, courts have exonerated the owner by rea-
soning that he had no control over the contractor's methods of opera-
tion, even though he never relinquished control over the premises. 7"
On the other hand, in cases of injuries caused by the negligent conduct
of co-workers, courts have spoken of the owner's liability for dangerous
conditions.17 3  Because the control doctrine is a relatively simple judi-
cial tool, courts, in order to avoid the task of analyzing fault, have em-
ployed it even in situations where the landowner clearly acted with rea-
sonable care.Y14  This reliance has given rise to technical distinctions
which bear little relation to the question of fault.'7 5  Further confusion
has resulted from a tendency to find control when the injured party
is an uninformed invitee, but not when the injured party is familiar with
the dangers.' 76  Perhaps recognizing the ambiguities and anomalies of
167. See PxossER, supra note 127, at 471.
168. Pace v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 346 F.2d 321, 323 (7th
Cir. 1965).
169. W. SEAVEY, LAw oF AGENcY § 84, at 142 (1964).
170. This general rule has been riddled with exceptions. See note 141 supra.
171. The distinction is not always easily made. Where conduct creates a dangerous
condition, an injury may be said to have been caused by both the conduct and the con-
dition. See, e.g., Popejoy v. Hannon, 37 Cal. 2d 159, 231 P.2d 484 (1951).
172. See, e.g., Nowicki v. Union Starch & Refining Co., 54 Il. 2d 93, 296 N.E.2d
321 (1973).
173. See, e.g., Knox v. United States Lines, 186 F. Supp. 668 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
174. See, e.g., Hader v. Coplay Cement Mfg. Co., 410 Pa. 139, 189 A.2d 270
(1963).
175. See, e.g., Foster v. American Oil Co., 172 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 1965).
176. See Crosby v. Meredith, 300 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1962); Hader v. Coplay Ce-
ment Mfg. Co., 410 Pa. 139, 189 A.2d 270 (1963); Nechodomu v. Lindstrom, 269 Wis.
the control doctrine, recent cases have found that control was shared,
177
or have avoided the question of control altogether, 178 determining lia-
bility upon the basis of reasonable care. In some cases this more flex-
ible approach has been required by statute. 179
There can be only two reasons for incorporating the relinquish-
ment of control doctrine into the 905(b) standard. First, it can be ar-
gued that the abolition of the unseaworthiness remedy rehabilitates the
old pre-Sieracki unseaworthiness and maritime negligence cases that
applied the relinquishment of control test.' 8 0  But courts have ex-
pressly held that maritime cases do not apply and that the 905(b)
standard is to be governed by a hypothetical national land-based juris-
diction.' This introduces the second argument; the committee re-
port's reference to land-based standards means that land-based notions
of relinquishment of control should be incorporated into 905(b) ac-
tions. The preferable interpretation of the committee report would be
that the reference to land-based standards does not demand the adop-
tion of specific rules, 8 2 but rather that it requires courts to exercise
their discretion in molding a negligence standard that generally con-
forms to land-based standards and that is free of concepts inappropriate
for maritime law. This interpretation is necessary because land-based
jurisdictions have conflicting rules, 8 3 and admiralty courts must exer-
cise their discretion in determining which rules are best applied to 905
(b) actions.
It would be unfortunate for the courts, in exercising this discre-
tion, to adopt a doctrine fraught with the confusion that surrounds relin-
quishment of control, particularly when there are indications that land-
based jurisdictions may be abandoning it.'8 4  The doctrine of control
may have some force when applied to an inexperienced landowner ig-
norant of the techniques and methods of an independent contractor.
But the shipowner-stevedore relationship is more similar to the rela-
455, 69 N.W.2d 608 (1955). Compare Campione v. Henry C. Lytton & Co., 57 Ill.
App. 2d 147, 206 N.E.2d 780 (1965) (building owner found not in control of elevator
from which employee of independent contractor fell), with Otis Elevator Co. v. Yager,
268 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1959) (building owner found in control of elevator from which
his own employee fell).
177. See, e.g., Wiseman v. United States, 327 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1964).
178. See, e.g., Danisan v. Cardinal Grocery Stores, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 2d 833, 318
P.2d 681 (1957).
179. See, e.g., Schwenn v. Loraine Hotel Co., 14 Wis. 2d 601, 111 N.W.2d 495
(1961), construing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.06 (1957), as amended, Wis. STAT. ANN. §
101.11(1) (1973).
180. See note 165 supra.
181. See Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 380 F. Supp. 222, 225-26 (E.D. Tex.
1974).
182. See note 69 & accompanying text supra.
183. See note 176 supra.
184. See notes 139-52 & accompanying text supra.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
January 19771 THE INJURED LONGSHOREMAN vs. THE SHIPOWNER 795
tionship of general and subcontractor, in which control is generally not
a factor."8 5 The vessel's agents usually have extensive knowledge of
stevedoring operations; they have operated the ship's equipment, they
have watched longshoreman perform, and they have probably even
handled cargo on occasion. The shipowner cannot be analogized to
the landowner ignorant of and inexperienced in the methods of an in-
dependent contractor.
The duty suggested by this note with respect to conditions arising
after the stevedore assumes control will undoubtedly be termed a "non-
delegable duty" and criticized as contrary to the committee report. 8 6
But it is difficult to know the exact meaning Congress attributed to
"nondelegable duty." The land-based standards to which Congress re-
ferred encompass many different kinds of nondelegable duties. In its
most limited sense, a nondelegable duty is merely a species of vicarious
liability.187  It imposes liability upon the employer of an independent
contractor for the conduct of the contractor for which, but for the duty,
the employer would not be liable. This includes situations in which
the contractor is actively negligent88 and situations in which the em-
ployer knows or has reason to know that the contractor is engaging in
the type of activities for which strict liability will be imposed. 9
But the term "nondelegable duty" is also used in a broader sense.
This broader meaning includes not only those situations in which the
employer's liability derives solely from the negligence of the independ-
ent contractor, but also those situations in which the employer is per-
sonally negligent. In such situations the employer's liability arises from
the presence of an unreasonably dangerous condition on his property.
Various land-based courts have held that this species of nondelegable
duty is owed to the employer's own employees, 90 to employees of inde-
185. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Robert J. Hiller Const. Co., 179 Cal. App. 2d 522, 530-
31, 3 Cal. Rptr. 832, 837 (1960); Connor v. Utah Const. & Mining Co., 231 Cal. App.
2d 263, 272-73, 41 Cal. Rptr. 728, 734 (1964).
186. See COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 6. There is some indication that
Congress intended the 905(b) negligence action to be governed by "standard Missouri
variety workmen's compensation" law. Hearings on S.231B, S.525, & S.1547 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., 273 (1972) (remarks of Senator Eagleton). Under Missouri law, an owner of
premises owes employees of an independent contractor a nondelegable duty to provide
a safe place to work. Schneider v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 354 S.W.2d 315, 319
(Mo. App. 1962).
187. PROssER, supra note 127, at 470; RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) or ToRTS, Intro-
ductory Note to §§ 416-29, at 394 (1965).
188. See Lineaweaver v. John Wanamaker Philadelphia, 299 Pa. 45, 149 A. 91
(1930).
189. See REsrATEM ENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs, Introductory Note to ,§§ 416-29, at
394-95 (1965).
190. Myers v. Little Church by the Side of the Road, 37 Wash. 2d 897, 227 P.2d
165 (1951).
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pendent contractors, 191 and to other business invitees. 92 This type of
nondelegable duty may arise whether the independent contractor cre-
ates the condition' 9" or merely fails to repair it or take other precau-
tions. 9 Such a duty may be imposed even when control over the
premises is shared 9 ' or has been relinquished to the contractor. 96 In
this sense, "nondelegable duty" seems to mean that the concurrent neg-
ligence of an independent contractor will not cut off the employer's lia-
bility for his personal negligence. In contrast to the vicarious liability
sense, it does not refer to an employer who is free from fault and whose
liability derives solely from the negligence of an independent contrac-
tor.
Further confusion is engendered by the special implications that
surrounded the term "nondelegable duty" during the Sieracki period.
Admiralty courts often spoke of the nondelegable duty of providing a
seaworthy ship.197  As unseaworthiness grew into a strict liability rem-
edy, the term "nondelegable duty" became associated with liability
without fault.19 When defense counsel objected that a particular in-
jury could not have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care
on anyone's part, the courts responded that the duty to provide a sea-
worthy ship was nondelegable.
It certainly cannot be contended that Congress intended to abolish
"nondelegable duty" in all its meanings. In its broadest sense "non-
delegable duty" is nothing more than a shorthand way of stating the
liability of an employer of an independent contractor without analyzing
the true ground upon which that liability rests.' 99 Since courts have
191. Warren v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp., 477 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1973); Schnei-
der v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 354 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. App. 1962); McDonnell Air-
craft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959).
192. Lineaweaver v. John Wanamaker Philadelphia, 299 Pa. 45, 50, 149 A. 91, 92
(1930); Blancher v. Bank of Cal., 47 Wash. 2d 1, 9, 286 P.2d 92, 95 (1955).
193. Webb v. Old Salem, Inc., 416 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1969); Schneider v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 354 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. App. 1962); Blancher v. Bank of Cal., 47
Wash. 2d 1, 286 P.2d 92 (1955).
194. Warren v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp., 477 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1973); McDon-
nell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959).
195. Blancher v. Bank of Cal., 47 Wash. 2d 1, 286 P.2d 92 (1955).
196. Warren v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Co., 477 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1973).
197. See, e.g., Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971); Mitchell
v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser,
358 U.S. 423 (1959).
198. "[The vessel's duty] is a 'nondelegable' duty in the sense that an owner will
nevertheless be liable for the negligence of an independent contractor who is hired to
repair or remedy the condition. But it is not 'nondelegable' as that term has been tradi-
tionally used in admiralty law to describe the absolute duty imposed by the doctrine of
seaworthiness .... " Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092, 1099
(D. Md. 1975).
199. See RESATEMmT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs, Introductory Note to §§ 416-29, at
394-95 (1965).
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held landowners liable on the ground that they owed a nondelegable
duty in cases where the landowners were personally negligent, 200 such
an interpretation of the committee report's abolition of nondelegable
duty would be tantamount to a holding that longshoremen could never
recover against the vessel. This would be manifestly contrary to the
letter of the statute and the spirit of the compromise that gave rise to
it.2 01
An interpretation of impermissible "nondelegable duty" as a spe-
cies of vicarious liability, however, would appear to be inconsistent with
the general congressional references to land-based standards. Such an
interpretation would bar recoveries by longshoremen in situations
within any of the well established exceptions to the general rule of non-
liability of the employer of an independent contractor,202 situations in
which land-based plaintiffs would always recover.
The most desirable interpretation of the committee report would
be that "nondelegable duty" was used there only in the special sense
that the term acquired during the Sieracki period and that Congress
intended to abolish only those no-fault theories which were unique to
the maritime law. 203  The context in which the term appears would
support this interpretaion. 0 4 This argument is not to be understood
as advocating the adoption of land-based notions of nondelegable duty.
Nondelegable duty is such an imprecise term that no discussion of the
concept in a judicial opinion can help lead to a rational result. Exclud-
ing the entire concept from the 905(b) action will prevent courts from
disposing of longshoremen's negligence claims merely by concluding
that to allow recovery would require imposing a nondelegable duty
upon the vessel. It is submitted, however, that requiring the vessel to
act with reasonable care, in light of its actual knowledge, to repair con-
ditions arising after the stevedore has commenced operations would
not conflict with the abolition of "nondelegable duty" in the limited
sense in which Congress appears to have used that term.2 05
200. See notes 190-96 & accompanying text supra.
201. In the tripartite compromise that gave rise to the amendments, longshoremen
sacrificed their unseaworthiness remedy in return for higher compensation benefits and
an assurance that some form of third party action would survive.
202. See REsTATEmENT (SncoND) OF TomuS §§ 416-29 (1965).
203. See note 198 supra.
204. 'The purpose of the amendments is to place an employee injured aboard a ves-
sel in the same position he would be if he were injured in non-maritime employment
ashore, insofar as bringing a third party damage action is concerned, and not to endow
him with any special maritime theory of liability or cause of action under whatever ju-
dicial nomenclature it may be called, such as 'unseaworthiness,' 'nondelegable' duty, or
the like." COMMITrE REPORT, supra note 9, at 5.
205. See Giacona v. Capricorn Shipping Co., 394 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
"When the Committee expresses its desire to do away with the nondelegable duty, it
seems evident from the context that their language is formed out of an abundance of
Summary
This proposal imposes a relatively high standard of care upon ves-
sels, and an accurate reflection of the factors contributing to longshore-
men's injuries requires that a high standard of care be imposed on the
longshoremen to protect themselves. Their trade is a risky one,2" 6 and
they are paid for their skill at working in dangerous surroundings.
They expect that after a long ocean voyage the ship will harbor a num-
ber of dangerous conditions. 20 7  Consequently, in caring for their own
safety, they should be required to act with the expertise, skills, and
knowledge possessed by a reasonable man in their particular trade.
The mere fact, however, that a dangerous condition is known, open,
or obvious should not in itself preclude a recovery. In encountering
a known danger, the longshoreman's duty to exercise care for his own
safety should be discharged by a complaint to the foreman,20 8 a demand
that the condition be repaired,20 9 or a request for special equipment.
If the longshoreman encounters a known danger without exercising
reasonable care for his own safety, his recovery should be reduced to
the extent that his negligence contributed to his injury. For example,
if a longshoreman chose to work around a cargo hole without demand-
ing dunnage, and if he became preoccupied with his tasks, forgot about
the hole, and stepped into it, then both his failure to complain and his
preoccupation would be deviations from his duty of care2 10 which con-
tributed to his injury. However, the mere fact that he chose to work
around the hole without complaining would not bar his recovery.21' Of
course, the proportion of relative fault is always a question for the
finder of fact, and the exact ratio should depend on the facts of each
case.
Conclusion
In the years after Sieracki, longshoremen stood an extremely high
chance of recovering a verdict with every complaint filed in court. In
effect, the Supreme Court developed a common law workmen's com-
pensation system which the lower courts reluctantly administered. Now
caution. Their concern is for the distinct possibility, given the history of federal court
rulings on the subject, that, the courts will construe the nondelegable admiralty negli-
gence as a cause of action amounting to unseaworthiness, a no-fault liability." Id. at
1193. Accord, Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092, 1099 n.2 (D.
Md. 1975); 1 A. BENEDicT ON ADMmALTY § 114, at 6-13 to -15 (7th ed. 1973).
206. CoMMrrME REPORT, supra note 9, at 4705.
207. Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 170 F. Supp. 601, 609-10 (S.D. Cal.
1959).
208. See notes 84-86 & accompanying text supra.
209. Id.
210. Cf. Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 1976 A.M.C. 551, 556 (2d Cir.).
211. See notes 84-86 & accompanying text supra.
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the pendulum has swung in the other direction. With longshoremen
finally receiving an adequate level of compensation benefits, courts evi-
dently feel that the third party action should be successful only in extra-
ordinary cases. Consequently, the courts have applied a number of de-
vices that cut off the vessel's liability without relation to the percentage
fault of the parties. These devices include a standard of care which
incorporates assumption of risk and contributory negligence as a com-
plete bar, relinquishment of control, the no nondelegable duty concept,
and the notion that the safety of longshoremen is the primary responsi-
bility of the stevedore.
This note accepts the notion that longshoremen should not recover
as easily as they have in the past. They surrendered the Sieracki rem-
edy in return for higher benefits, and for the courts to give it back to
them would contravene the legislative compromise embodied in the
1972 amendments.
However, the legal devices that the courts have used to restrict
the 905(b) action are unacceptable. Their only validity arises from
general references in the congressional committee report to land-based
standards, strict liability theories, and nondelegable duties. These
devices are inconsistent with other specific references in the committee
report as well as with general traditions of the maritime law. The pro-
posed alternative standard of care is merely a sketch and does not pur-
port to be complete. But it is submitted that the proposed standard
is more in harmony with maritime traditions than the developing busi-
ness invitee standard of care.
John Deacon*
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